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A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character 
Requirement for Bar Admission 
Michael K McChrystal* 
American jurisdictions universally require good moral character 
for admission to the bar. 1 The good moral character requirement 
has eluded useful definition and has been described as possessing 
"shadowy rather than precise bounds."2 The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the requirement is constitutionally permissible as 
long as pre-admission conduct which is the basis for denying bar ad-
mission has a "rational connection with the applicant's fitness or ca-
pacity to practice law."3 
Because the requirement of good moral character for bar admis-
sion is designed principally to protect the public from unethicallaw-
yers,4 the assertion of any such rational connection requires the belief 
that an applicant's conduct during the bar admission process serves 
as a useful predictor of how he will behave if admitted to practice 
law. Thus, the prevailing view of bar admission authorities is that 
past conduct predicts future conduct. 5 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Member, Wisconsin 
Board of Attorneys Professional Competence (the bar admission board in Wisconsin). The 
author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Professor Charles D. Clausen and Mr. 
Robert Koenig to the development of this article. 
1 &e genera/{J WEST PUBLISHING Co., RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THC. BAR IN THC. 
UNITED STATES AND Tc.RRITORIES (1982); VII MARTINDALE-Huaac.LL LAw DIRECTORY 
(1984). For example, SuP. CT. R. 5.1 provides in part: "It shall be requisite to the admission 
to practice in this Coun . . . that the applicant appears to the Court to be of good moral and 
·professional character." 
2 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 249 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
3 /d. at 239. 
4 Su MODEL CoDE 01' PROI'F.SSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1982); see also Florida 
Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978); In re Taylor, 647 P.2d 462, 
467 (Or. 1982); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examine~, 266 S.E.2d 444, 450 (W. 
Va. 1980). 
An additional rationale for the good moral character requirement is to protect the or-
derly administration of justice. Although this goal has more frequent relevance in lawyer 
discipline cases, it is also mentioned as a concern in bar admission cases. E.g., Ex Parle Wall, 
107 U.S. 265, 274 (1883) (disbarment); Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 
447, 462, 421 P.2d 76, 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 239 (1966) (bar admission). 
5 Although expressed in a dissenting opinion, the prevailing view is stated well in In re 
Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 21, 55 S.E. 635, 642 (1906) (Brown, J., dissenting): 
[IJf the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character, the 
67 
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Although this is a rational and attractive premise, it has not 
been proven empirically in the context of bar admission. 6 Bar admis-
sion authorities are unlikely to employ, in the foreseeable future, any 
psychometrically-sound device to assist in determining whether ap-
plicants satisfy the good moral character requirement. 7 In the ab-
chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace, 
instead of an ornament, to his great calling, a curse, instead of a benefit, to his 
community, a Quirk, a Gammon, or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith, or a 
Ruffin. 
It is interesting to compare the treatment of past conduct in bar admission cases with its 
treatment under the rules of evidence. Generally, evidence of past wrongs is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show the commission of subsequent acts. &<!' FED. 
R. Evm. 404(b); if. FED. R. Evm. 405(a). While evidence tending to prove an actor's propen-
sity to commit acts of a given sort generally may be excluded in other settings, proof of such 
propensities is at the heart of moral character assessments in bar admission cases. See also 
Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidmce: Evidmce Code Section .J52 a11d the Impact of 
Recmt Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984). 
6 In the early 1970's, an American Bar Association committee proposed research studies 
to identify character traits which, when present in a lawyer, make it highly likely that the 
lawyer would engage in unethical conduct. The goal was to test whether bar admission appli-
cants possessed the offending traits and to deny admission to those who did. See Jaworski, 
Pmidmt's Page, 58 A.B.A. J. 667 (1972); lriformatzon Report of the Sectzon of Legal Educalzon and 
Admission lo /he Bar, 97 REPORTS 01 .. A.B.A. 984 (1972). 
An excerpt from the committee report appears in Dershowitz, Preventive /Jisbarmmt: The 
Numbers Are Agaznstlt, 58 A.B.A. J- 815 (1972). The report proposed: 
/d. 
A. An interdisciplinary inquiry into what is now being done or projected in 
other professions or businesses: 
(1) To identify those significant elements of character that may predictably 
give rise to misconduct in violation of professional responsibilities. 
(2) To estimate the capacity of those inimical elements to persist despite the 
maturing process of the individual and the impact of the stabilizing influence of 
legal education. 
B. A "hindsight" study of selected cases of proved dereliction of lawyers to 
ascertain whether any discoverable predictive information could have been ob-
tained at the law student level by feasible questionnaires or investigations; and if so, 
what type of inquiry would have been fruitfuL 
Alan Dershowitz argued convincingly against the empirical feasibility of using such 
methods to screen out future violators of professional standards. See gmeral(p Dershowitz, 
supra. Dershowitz contended that any such screening device would likely ensnare more per-
sons who would establish clean records as lawyers than future violators. /d. 
7 But if. L. KoHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY oF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES 
AND THE IDEA 01:' jUSTICE 409-12 (1981). Kohlberg identified various stages of moral devel-
opment and devised operational measures for assessing an individual's moral development. 
Kohlberg's stages relate principally to the relative sophistication of a person's moral reason-
ing. 
Sophisticated moral reasoning, however, does not ensure moral conduct. Moral conduct 
requires the identification of the moral problem at issue so that moral reasoning may be 
invoked to resolve the problem. In addition, moral conduct requires action in accord with the 
results of the moral reasoning: an actor may morally reason on a sophisticated level and then 
act contrary to the conclusions he reaches. Moreover, even if a person identifies the moral 
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sence of any effective testing device, an applicant's moral character is 
ordinarily assessed through information gathered from applications 
and questionnaires, letters of recommendation, follow-up investiga-
tions, interviews, and hearings.8 Bar admission authorities decide 
whether an applicant meets the good moral character requirement 
by assessing all of the relevant facts before them. Justice Frankfurter 
described this decision-making ·process: 
No doubt satisfaction of the requirement of moral character in-
volves an exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who 
reach a conclusion, having heard and seen the applicant for ad-
mission, a judgment . . . that . . . expresses "an intuition of ex-
perience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed 
and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath con-
sciousness without losing their worth."9 
Decisions which rely on "unnamed and tangled impressions . 
which may lie beneath consciousness" run serious risks, especially 
when they may be devastating to a bar admission applicant's future 
livelihood and reputation. Bar admission decisions will be more con-
sistent, rational, and just if the reasons supporting them are con-
sciously recognized, clearly stated, and explicitly related to the 
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Visceral reactions are 
an inadequate basis for denying an applicant a license to practice 
law. Bar admission authorities should be expected to articulate the 
rational connection between the grounds for their moral character 
objections to an applicant's admission and the applicant's fitness or 
capacity to practice law. 
This article is an effort to raise consciousness, principally by 
identifying significant threads that make up the fabric of the good 
moral character requirement. 1o This purpose is moderately frus-
trated by two dynamics. First, unless bar admission authorities seek 
to block an applicant's admission on moral character grounds, the 
problem, analyzes the problem in a sophisticated way, and acts in accord with his analysis, 
the act may be antithetical to professional standards if the actor possesses values different 
than those of the profession. Therefore, the work of Kohlberg and his colleagues does not 
necessarily hold the key to improving moral character assessments in the bar admission pro-
cess, though the work holds special interest for those engaged in making such assessments. 
8 For an expanded discussion, see BAR EXAMINER's HANDBOOK 137-87 (S. Duhl ed. 
1980). 
9 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,248 (1957) (Frankfurter,]., concur-
ring) (quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907)). 
10 Although relevant to the good moral character requirement for bar admission, this 
article does not address good moral character standards in other professions or in immigration 
and naturalization cases, nor does it assess due process considerations in applying the stan-
dard in bar admission cases. 
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result of the moral character assessment is generally not reported. 
Thus, a host of cases in which bar admission was granted notwith-
standing blemishes relating to moral character evade evaluation. 
This may conceal some of the greatest inconsistencies among bar ad-
mission cases. Second, courts are often cursory in describing the un-
derlying facts and in offering the rationales for their decisions in 
moral character cases. 1 1 
In most states, the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility constitute the ethical duties imposed upon lawyers 
and form the only bases for a finding of unfitness to practice law. 12 
Not all violations of the disciplinary rules prove unfitness to practice. 
Certainly, violations of disciplinary rules which do not result in the 
offending lawyer losing his license for any period of time cannot sup-
port a finding of unfitness to practice, since a lawyer could not be 
permitted to retain his licensure without interruption if he were 
deemed unfit to practice. 13 Conversely, the imposition of the severe 
sanctions of long-term suspension from practice or disbarment must 
surely reflect a determination that the offending lawyer is unfit to 
practice law. 
The fact that the disciplinary rules embody the full statement of 
bases for determining that a lawyer is unfit to practice for reasons of 
misconduct 14 has significant implications in assessing the appropriate 
11 Extremely vague denials of admission to the bar may violate due process requirements. 
See In Re Berkan, 648 F.2d 1386, 1388 (1st Cir. 1981) (applicant was informed of her denial in 
a one-sentence letter providing no reasons). 
12 Conduct not proscribed in a specific disciplinary rule may be grounds for disbarment, 
but only if it is "conduct which all responsible lawyers would recognize as improper for a 
member of the profession." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 555 (1968) (White, J., concurring}. 
This exception becomes superfluous under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
which contains a catch-all rule prohibiting "any other conduct that adversely reflects on [the 
lawyer's} fitness to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PRO~'ESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-
102(A)(6) (1982). This provision also makes clear the Code's position that all lawyer miscon-
duct under the Code adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. See also i'd. 
Canon 1 n.14. 
13 A determination of unfitness to practice logically accompanies the sanctions of suspen-
sion (for more than a nominal duration) and disbarment in the same jurisdiction in which the 
determination is made. The situation differs when the issue concerns the effect of disciplinary 
action taken by one jurisdiction on licensure in another jurisdiction. Generally, one jurisdic-
tion is not bound by disciplinary action in another jurisdiction, even though bar admission in 
that jurisdiction is derived from admission in the other jurisdiction. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 
544, 547 (1968) (effects of a state's disciplinary action on lawyer's admission to practice in 
federal court). &e generally Annot., 173 A.L.R. 298 (1948) (effect of one state's disciplinary 
action on lawyer's admission to practice in another state). 
14 Even the catch-all provision of DR 1-L02(A)(6) rarely supplies a sole basis for discipli-
nary action. A LEXIS search for attorney discipline cases in which DR l-102(A)(6) is cited 
disclosed 676 cases in state courts, only two of which did not also invoke some other discipli-
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scope of the good moral character requirement. Bar admission can 
be denied on moral character grounds only upon a finding of unfit-
ness to practice law, 15 which is defined by the ethical duties imposed 
upon lawyers, usually under some variant of the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. It follows, then, that only that pre-admis-
sion conduct which indicates that the applicant would violate 
disciplinary rules if admitted to practice may justify a finding of lack 
of good moral character. 
Notwithstanding the logic of this approach, some jurisdictions 
distinguish between moral character standards for applicants to the 
bar and for admitted lawyers. These jurisdictions usually hold that 
the standards of behavior for bar admission applicants are less de-
fined and more expansive than the ethical duties to which lawyers 
are bound. 16 This produces the anomalous result that persons must 
demonstrate a better moral character to be granted a license to prac-
tice law than to keep it. 
Reported decisions involving questions of good moral character 
offer no compelling justification for this unequal treatment. 17 The 
usual justification is evidentiary in nature: bar admission applicants 
generally have the burden of establishing good moral character, 18 
nary rule as a basis for a judicially imposed sanction. One of these cases involved an attor-
ney's unauthorized disbursement of funds held in escrow to his client. In re Power, 91 N.J. 
4{)8, 451 A.2d 666 (1982). The other case involved a lawyer's failure to file a client's tax 
return with the court in connection with the client's petition for a reduction in alimony pay-
ments. In response to the attorney's claim that no disciplinary rule encompasses mere negli-
gence, the court invoked DR 1-l02(A)(6). In re Logan, 71 N.J. 583, 367 A.2d 419 (1976), 
modijjing 70 N.J. 222, 358 A.2d 787 (1976). 
15 Although bar admission may be denied on moral character grounds whenever the 
applicant's conduct adversely reflects on his or her fitness or capaci'!J' to practice law, the word 
"capacity" adds little in such cases. It is difficult to conceive of a moral character case in 
which the applicant is adjudged fit for law practice and otherwise qualified for admission, yet 
is determined to lack capacity for law practice. While it is possible to ascribe a narrow mean-
ing to "fitness" so that "capacity" becomes an important consideration, courts do not appear 
to have done so. No cases have been discovered where the court, in the context of a moral 
character assessment, focuses primarily on an applicant's "capacity" to practice law. 
16 Su In re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 474-75, 163 P. 657, 660 (1917); In re Florida Bd. of Bar 
Examiners, 373 So. 2d 890, 891 (Fla. 1979); see also In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 75, 98 P.2d 
489,491 (1940) ("[T]he court may properly refuse to admit an applicant to practice law upon 
proof which would not justify an order of disbarment.'~. 
17 Early cases sometimes distinguished an admitted lawyer's property right in continued 
licensure from an applicant's mere expectancy oflicensure. See In re O'Brien, 79 Conn. 46, 55, 
63 A. 777, 780 (1906), overruled on due process grounds, In re Dinan, 157 Conn. 67, 72, 244 A.2d 
608, 610 (1968). This distinction is rarely made in modern cases. See Reese v. Board of 
Comm'rs, 379 So. 2d 564, 569 (Ala. 1980). 
18 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 41 (1961); In re Ascher, 81 Ill. 2d 
485, 411 N.E.2d 1 (1980); In re Moore, 301 N.C. 634, 272 S.E.2d 826 (1981). 
Generally, the applicant has the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of good 
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while the burden of proving a lawyer's unethical conduct generally 
falls on the discipline board. 19 Courts have used these differing bur-
dens of proof to justify a more expansive scope of relevancy in bar 
admission cases. Some courts avoid the evidentiary clutter resulting 
from an expansive scope of relevancy by summarily holding that the 
applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving good moral char-
acter, without clearly specifying the weight given to negative evi-
dence or identifying the connection between the negative evidence 
and fitness to practice law. 
Some jurisdictions may apply a more stringent standard to bar 
applicants than to admitted lawyers on the theory that lawyers are 
subject to greater temptations to engage in misconduct. Succumbing 
to lesser temptations is, arguably, more telling morally than suc-
cumbing to greater temptations. Moreover, one who succumbs to 
lesser temptations prior to bar admission may be especially likely to 
misbehave when confronted by the greater temptations present in 
law practice. While this reasoning is appealing at first blush, it is a 
highly speculative basis for depriving an otherwise-qualified individ-
ual of the opportunity to practice his chosen profession. In particu-
lar, it ignores the serious temptations to which bar applicants are 
often subject by virtue of their social and economic circumstances. 
In some respects, the social and economic circumstances in which 
lawyers live and work may be less conducive to serious temptation 
than applicants' pre-admission circumstances.20 
It is a premise of this article that bar applicants and admitted 
lawyers should be treated similarly; thus, bar admission authorities 
should deny admission only if past misconduct portends that the ap-
plicant, if admitted, would engage in conduct unacceptable for a li-
censed lawyer. Unacceptable conduct for a licensed lawyer is 
conduct prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility, or 
whatever ethical standards the jurisdiction imposes upon its licensed 
lawyers. This requirement serves the important goal of protecting 
moral character, which the bar admission authority may introduce evidence to rebut. Ste In 
re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 57, 253 S.E.2d 912, 918 (1979). 
19 See, e.g., Dodd v. Board of Comm'rs, 365 So. 2d 975, 977 (Ala. 1979); State ex reL 
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Erickson, 204 Neb. 692, 700, 285 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1979); see also 
In re Burrows, 291 Or. 135, 629 P.2d 820 (1981). 
20 Several forces work in combination to lessen the temptation to which lawyers are sub-
ject. Lawyers typically enjoy greater financial security than the public at large. Peer pressure 
within the profession discourages misconduct, and lawyers often work in groups in which 
supervision by peers increases the likelihood that wrongful conduct will be detected. The 
adversary process itself may discourage lawyer misconduct, and the threat of disbarment pro-
vides an additional deterrent. 
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the public equally from new unfit lawyers and from experienced un-
fit lawyers. When addressing the question of whether to admit an 
applicant who has engaged in misconduct, bar admission authorities 
and courts should be substantially guided by the treatment afforded 
admitted lawyers who engage in similar misconduct. In all events, 
bar admission authorities and courts should look to an applicant's 
more recent conduct to determine whether rehabilitation has cor-
rected a past unfitness.21 
With few exceptions,22 bar admission cases involving the good 
moral character requirement fall within the following categories: 
political belief and conduct; misconduct in the bar admission process; 
past illegal conduct; financial malfeasance; and emotional or mental 
instability. Each of these categories of misconduct will be discussed 
in turn, with a focus upon the nature ofthe conduct and its relation 
to ethical standards imposed upon lawyers. 
I. Political Belief and Conduct 
Bar admission cases in which the applicant's moral character is 
at issue because of the applicant's political belief or conduct fall 
within three general categories; cases in which the applicant's polit-
ical beliefs and actions have been disclosed and the bar admission 
authority must decide whether to deny admission based on the appli-
cant's politics per se; cases in which the applicant has engaged in 
politically-motivated illegal conduct;23 and cases in which the appli-
cant declines to answer questions of a political nature in the bar ad-
mission process, thereby giving rise to charges of misconduct in that 
process.24 
Thought, speech, association, and conduct in the bar admission 
process enjoy constitutional protection. In Schware v. Board of .Bar Ex-
aminers,25 the California court prohibited an applicant to the bar 
from taking the bar examination because he had not shown good 
21 In order to satisfy the requirement, the applicant must be of good moral character at 
the time of admission. Se.r In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978); In rtTaylor, 293 Or. 285, 647 
P.2d 462 (1982). Stt gmeral{y Annot. 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978). 
22 See, e.g., In reApplication for Admission to the Bar, 378 Mass. 795, 392 N.E.2d 533 
(1979) (applicant used judicial processes in a way inconsistent with standards expected of 
lawyers), mi. tftni'ed, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); In rt Bowers, 138 Tenn. 662, 200 S.W. 821 (1918) 
(applicant solicited business for a lawyer and drafted contingent-fee agreements for 50% fee). 
23 Ste gentral{y text accompanying notes 84-113 in.fra. 
24 See text accompanying notes 50-66 in.fra. 
25 353 U.S. 232 (1957). The Supreme Court held that previous membership in the Com-
munist party, use of aliases, and arrests without formal charges, did not under the circum-
stances establish grounds for refusal of admission to the bar. 
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moral character. Schware had been a member of the Communist 
Party for eight years, but had not been a member for the thirteen 
years before he applied to take the examination. In reversing, the 
Supreme Court held that in order for political expression to form the 
basis for denial of admission to the bar on moral character grounds, 
the expression must bear some "rational connection with the appli-
cant's fitness or capacity to practice law. "26 
The law clearly answers the question of when bar admission 
may be denied on the basis of an applicant's politics per se. 
"[K]nowing membership in an organization advocating the over-
throw of the Government by force or violence, on the part of one 
sharing the specific intent to further the organization's illegal goals, 
may be made criminally punishable"27 and presumably may be the 
basis for denial of admission to the bar on moral character grounds. 
The rule has been clearly formulated, although not easily applied. In 
any event, few courts have denied admission explicitly on such 
grounds.28 
Politically-motivated criminal activity has generated an interest-
ing line of moral character cases. Disciplinary rules prohibit a lawyer 
from knowingly counseling or assisting a client in engaging in illegal 
conduct29 and, from engaging in illegal conduct in the lawyer's own 
right in the course of representing a client.30 In addition, the discipli-
nary rules prohibit a lawyer from engaging in illegal conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude and from engaging in acts which are prejudicial 
to the administration ofjustice.31 These standards, which help define 
fitness to practice law, may be rationally connected to an applicant's 
26 /d. at 239; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 44-46 (1961). 
27 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165 
(1971); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the constitutionality 
of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982), which makes it a crime, under some circumstances, 
to advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence). 
28 See, e.g., Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 10 Cal. 3d 156, 514 P.2d 967, 110 Cal. 
Rptr. IS (1973), in which the bar admissions committee refused to certify the applicant's good 
moral character because he had falsely testified before the committee in saying he had not 
advocated violent political action, rather than because he had publicly advocated violent 
political action. But see In re Cassidy, 268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), a.lf'd on reheanng, 
270 A.D. 1046, 63 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1946), ojfd per curiam, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947). 
29 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1982); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (as adopted by the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar Association on August 2, 1983), reprinted in 69 A.B.A. J. 1671 (1983). 
30 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(8) (1982); if. MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983). 
31 MODEL CODE Of' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR l-102(A)(3),(5) (1982); if. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b),(d) (1983). See genera/(y text accom-
panying notes 84-102 iiifia. 
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politically-inspired illegal conduct or advocacy of violent overthrow 
of the government. If they are, then the applicant may properly be 
denied admission to the bar .. 
On the other hand, it is wise to consider the effect of a wholesale 
exclusion of applicants whose political beliefs and action are of this 
nature. In his stirring dissent in In re Anastap!o,32 Justice Black ex-
tolled the heroic courage of lawyers who "dared to speak in defense 
of causes and clients without regard to personal danger to them-
selves."33 Regarding the need for these dissident voices in the bar, 
Justice Black wrote: 
The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if 
it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force 
the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, 
government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it. 
. . . [T]he Government is being permitted to strike out at 
those who are fearless enough to think as they please and say 
what they think.3"-
The Supreme Court of Washington ignored these considerations 
in In re Brooks, 35 in which the court denied permission to take the bar 
examination to a conscientious objector who had, more than a dec-
ade before, violated criminal law by refusing to report to a civilian 
labor camp. The divided court denied Brooks' application because 
he had defied the law by refusing to honor his duty to his country 
and its "great heritage of liberty."36 
The duty to obey the law (the corollary of impermissible defi-
ance of law) is generally not applied with strict exactitude in bar 
32 366 u.s. 82 (1961). 
33 /d. at 115 (Black,J., dissenting). On a list oflawyers possessing "the uncommon virtue 
of courage to stand by (their] principles at any cost," Justice Black included Malsherbes, who 
defended Louis XVI against the revolutionary government of France at the cost of his life; 
Chief Justice Hughes, who as a lawyer defended socialist members of the New York legisla-
~ ture who were suspended from that body because of their political views; Clarence Darrow; 
and others. ld. at 114-15. 
34 /d. at 115-16. 
35 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), mt. dm,.~tl, 365 U.S. 813 {1961). 
36 ld. at 69, 355 P.2d at 842; su alto In u Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), in which the 
Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court denying the petitioner's application 
for admission to the Illinois bar. The petitioner's religious beliefs made him a conscientious 
objector to military service, who eschewed the use of force regardless of circumstances. Al-
though the petitioner had not violated any law, the justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois 
denied the petitioner's application because they determined that he could not swear, in good 
conscience, to uphold the Illinois constitution, which contained a provision requiring men in 
petitioner's age group to serve in. the state militia in time of war. The Supreme Court held 
that the denial did not violate the first amendment as applied to the states by the fourteenth 
amendment. 
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admission cases. Cases abound in which applicants were admitted to 
the bar notwithstanding prior criminal convictions,37 even recent 
ones.38 The disciplinary rules do not suggest that lawyers be disci-
plined for all forms of criminal conduct.39 Rather, when lawyers en-
gage in criminal conduct, courts consider the nature of the conduct 
and the circumstances surrounding it. These considerations are espe-
cially relevant where the applicant's criminal conduct involves polit-
ical expression. 
With these considerations in mind, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, in Halli'nan v. Commi'ttee of Bar Examiners,40 admitted an appli-
cant to the bar notwithstanding his convictions for unlawful 
assembly, remaining present at a place of unlawful assembly, dis-
turbing the peace, and trespass upon land for the purpose of ob-
structing lawful business, all in connection with a civil rights sit-in. 
The court emphasized the non-violent nature of these acts and the 
widespread view that non-violent civil disobedience can be a mor-
ally-legitimate form of political expression. The court cited the 
works of several legal scholars on the legitimacy of civil disobedience, 
as well as works by Thoreau, Laski, Gandhi, Plato and Aristotle.41 
Broolcs and Hallinan are inconsistent, at least in their treatment of 
non-violent civil disobedience, since the Broolcs court ignored the ap-
plicant's motivation in refusing to report for alternative service. The 
opinion identified no rational connection between the applicant's 
dated illegal conduct and his present fitness to practice law, except to 
say: 
We are not inclined to adopt a transitory theory as to the 
applicant's character. Age alone has not reduced his potential 
for war resistance to zero. . . . An old lawyer can impede his 
country's war effort in many ways as well as a young one.42 
This, of course, avoids the crucial issue, which is the relationship 
of draft resistance to fitness to practice law, or, more specifically, 
whether a former draft resistor is likely to breach ethical duties. The 
37 Su Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978). 
38 See, e.g., In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1966) ("[A] 
conviction of petty larceny would not deprive an individual of his or her right to be admitted 
to The Florida Bar if otherwise qualified. '1· 
39 MODEL CODE o~· PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-l02(A)(3) (1982); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983). &e genttral(y text accompanying 
notes 84-113 1;yi-a. 
40 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966). 
41 /d. at 461, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239. 
42 In re Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d at 68, 355 P.2d at 841. 
HeinOnline -- 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 76 1984-1985 
1984) BAR ADMISSION 77 
court denied admission on moral character grounds without identify-
ing the rational connection required by Schwan:. 
The commission of minor crimes in the furtherance of morally-
legitimate political objectives can be of substantial service to society. 
This is a nation which once permitted slavery, denied women the 
right to vote, reneged on treaties with Indian nations, and interned 
life-long citizens solely because of their Japanese ancestry. Who 
knows which of our current national policies and laws will be re-
jected as morally repugnant in future years? Moral leaders who call 
attention to an immoral status quo may be required to engage in 
minor acts of civil disobedience to do so. 
Political advocacy which is criminal per se poses unique 
problems in the context of the good moral character requirement.43 
Where an applicant has committed a non-political crime motivated 
by political belief, it is unlikely that his licensure as a lawyer poses 
risks any greater than those ordinarily associated with the admission 
of a person who has committed that crime. Therefore, criminal con-
duct motivated by political belief should certainly carry no greater 
weight in the bar admission process than criminal conduct not so 
motivated. In fact, the political motivation may be an ameliorating 
factor because of the moral legitimacy of some forms of civil disobe-
dience. In no event should the political motivation be seen as an 
aggravating factor.44 
Consistent with the disciplinary rules, political belief and con-
duct ought to be invoked to deny bar admission only when a political 
crime has been committed.45 This does not require that the appli-
cant have been convicted of a political crime; the "conviction" may 
43 A state may deny admission to the bar on moral character grounds if the applicant 
cannot, in good conscience, swear to the attorney's oath required in most jurisdictions. In re 
Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). Attorney's oaths typically require an attorney to swear to 
support the constitutions of the United States and the state ~here the attorney seeks admis-
sion to the bar. See", e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-60-4 (West 1983). The illegal advocacy of 
overthrow of the government by force or violence poses moral character difficulties for this 
and other reasons. 
44 Consider three hypothetical cases in which an applicant has been convicted of mali-
cious destruction of government property: (1) the act has no political overtones and is com-
mitted only for the "thrill" of it; (2) the act is done to protest the war in Vietnam; and (3) the 
act is done to show opposition to court-ordered busing to cure past illegal school segregation. 
Assuming that questions of rehabilitation are not at issue, neither the second nor third case 
should be treated more harshly in the bar admission process than the first case. An argument 
could be made for treating the second case less harshly than the other cases. 
45 Although it is not easy to define "political" crimes, certain crimes seem to qualify, 
including treason, sabotage, sedition, and Hag desecration. See, e.g., WIS. STAT.§§ 946.01-.06 
(1982). Even absent rehabilitation, it is not clear that all such criminal acts should be an 
impediment to bar admission on moral character grounds. The test remains whether the act 
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be reached in the bar admission process itself.46 Convictions for some 
political crimes may adversely reflect on the applicant's fitness to 
practice law, particularly where the criminal conduct reflects such 
distrust of the legal process that the applicant, absent a change of 
heart, would likely violate ethical duties imposed upon lawyers.47 
The rational connection required by Schware might be present in 
those cases. 
II. Misconduct in the Bar Admission Process 
If the good moral character requirement is to be effective, an 
applicant's failure to truthfully disclose material information solic-
ited by bar admission authorities must be an impediment to admis-
sion. Misconduct in the bar admission process is one of the most 
frequently cited bases for denial of admission on moral character 
grounds. 
Applicants are expected to answer all questions truthfully and 
completely.48 Failure to disclose material, solicited information 
adversely reflects on the applicant's fitness to practice law. Su text accompanying notes 14-23 
supra. 
46 Bar admission authorities may independently assess evidence of prior misconduct 
notwithstanding an acquittal or dismissal of criminal charges relating to that misconduct. Su 
In re Leff, 127 Ariz. 62, 618 P.2d 232 (1980) (no criminal charges filed for impeding an IRS 
undercover investigation); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re L.K.D., 397 So. 2d 673 {Fla. 1981) 
(acquittal of shoplifting charge); Nail v. Board of Bar Examiners, 98 N.M. 172, 646 P.2d 1236 
(1982) (charges of conspiracy to sell heroin dropped). 
But .ree Martin B. v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 33 Cal. 3d 717, 661 P.2d 160, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 610 (1983), where the court reiterated the general principle that bar admission authori-
ties may assess evidence of misconduct even if criminal charges based on the misconduct were 
terminated in favor of an applicant. However, the court held that the committee erred in 
conducting a "retrial" of ten-year-old rape charges, where original transcripts and some key 
witnesses were unavailable and the presiding judge at the criminal trial was deceased. 
See al.ro In re Cassidy, 268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S. 202 (1944), affd on reheari'ng, 270 A.D. 1046, 
63 N.Y.S. 840 (1946), affdpercun"am, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947), where evidence of the 
applicant's advocacy of unlawfully forming armed units for use against what he considered to 
be subversive elements was the basis for denial of admission, notwithstanding the applicant's 
acquittal of a criminal conspiracy charge based on the same conduct. 
47 See note 46 supra. Whether a given political crime adversely reflects on the applicant's 
fitness to practice law would depend at least on the gravity of the crime and the motivation of 
the applicant in committing the crime. For example, publicly desecrating a flag may be 
motivated by opposition to a single government policy, such as the war in Vietnam, and 
might not be treated as adversely reflecting on the perpetrator's fitness to practice law. 
48 q{. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-lOl(A) (1982); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 8.1 (1983). Because good moral character is an 
unpredictable standard, the applicant who has engaged in (or been accused of engaging in) 
conduct which may raise questions of moral character has a serious tactical problem in decid-
ing how to disclose that information. Bare disclosure without comment may provoke charges 
of lack of candor, while disclosure with explanation or defense may also provoke charges of 
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surely raises questions about the applicant's fitness for law practice 
and may be the basis for denial of admission to the bar.49 Fraud on 
courts and tribunals is an extremely grave offense under the discipli-
nary rules,50 and the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly 
prohibits lawyers from making materially false statements or failing 
to disclose material, solicited facts in the bar admission process.31 No 
aspect of the good moral character requirement more directly impli-
cates ethical standards imposed upon lawyers than the prohibition 
against misconduct in the bar admission process. 
The Supreme Court has affirmed the propriety of denying bar 
admission to applicants who refuse to answer questions relevant to 
moral character.52 A particularly striking decision by the Court in 
this area is In re Anastaplo,53 in which an applicant was denied admis-
sion to the Illinois bar notwithstanding "a mountain of evidence so 
favorable to Anastaplo that the word 'overwhelming' seems inade-
quate to describe it. "54 Anastaplo had refused, on first amendment 
grounds, to answer questions concerning membership in the Commu-
nist Party or any other organization on the Attorney General's list of 
subversive organizations. No evidence suggested that the applicant 
advocated violent overthrow of the government or engaged in con-
duct which could, if proven, lead to denial of his application for ad-
mission to the bar. His failure to cooperate fully in the character 
investigation55 was sufficient to support denial of admission. 
lack of candor or lack of rehabilitation. Disclosure with repentance may be seen as tanta-
mount to an admission of guilt. 
49 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961); see also In re Walker, 112 
Ariz. 134, 539 P.2d 891 (1975) (non-disclosure of failure to register for the draft and prior 
arrest warrants), mi. dmied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); In re: Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771 
(1975) (misrepresentation concerning prior arrests and Air Force discharge), appeal dismissed 
sub nom. Willis v. North Carolina State Bd. of Law Examiners, 423 U.S. 976 (1975); In re 
Capace, 110 R.I. 254, 291 A.2d 632 (1972) (untruthful denial that another person took the 
Law School Admission Test for the applicant). 
50 Sfe MODEL CODE Ol' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4)-(5), 7-
l02(A)(l)-(6), 7-106(B) (1982); MODEL RULES OF PROF.I:'.SSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3, 3.4(b), 
8.4(c),(d) (1983). 
51 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY DR 1-101 (B) (1982); ste also MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (1983). 
52 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
53 366 u.s. 82 (1961). 
54 /d. at 107 (Black, J., dissenting). 
55 The applicant was forthright in responding to all questions, including those related to 
his political beliefs, except that he refused to answer questions concerning his religious views 
and affiliations, whether he was ever a member of the Communist Party, and whether he ever 
belonged to any organization on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. The 
questions were triggered by Anastaplo's support of the right of revolution against an oppres-
sive government, a right asserted in the Declaration of Independence. This support was ex-
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Anastaplo may be criticized for permitting bar admission author-
ities to pursue highly intrusive fishing expeditions as part of the 
moral character inquiry.56 Its greater weakness, however, is that it 
denied admission to an applicant on moral character grounds with-
out any evidence of deceit or other wrongdoing. The applicant in 
Anastaplo was forthright in refusing to answer questions, his refusal 
was narrow and principled, and no evidence was adduced . to show 
that he concealed damaging facts. 
Koni'gsberg v. State Bar oJ Califomi'a, 57 decided at the same time as 
Anastaplo, presents a closer case, since the questions which the appli-
cant in Konigsberg refused to answer were prompted by damaging in-
formation provided to the bar admission authorities. A witness in 
the applicant's character investigation stated that the applicant had 
attended meetings of members of the Communist Party. When ques-
tioned about his association with the Communist Party, the appli-
cant refused to answer on first amendment grounds. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the California decision denying bar admission.58 The 
political questions posed to the applicant in Koni'gsberg were "substan-
tial[ly] relevan[t] to his qualifications" because of the existence of 
damaging information. Since there was no such damaging evidence 
in Anastap!o, it is questionable whether extended inquiry into the ap-
plicant's political beliefs had "substantial relevance to his 
qualifications." 
Subsequent to Koni'gsberg and Anastaplo, the Supreme Court has 
held that an applicant's views and beliefs are immune from questions 
"designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the prac-
tice oflaw."59 Also, an applicant may not be denied admission to the 
bar "sole()' because he is a member of a particular political organiza-
pressed in response to a question on the bar admission application asking the applicant to 
identify the principles underlying the United States Constitution. 
56 Anastaplo was asked whether he was associated 
with scores of organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan, the Silver Shirts (an al-
legedly Fascist organization), every organization on the so-called Attorney General's 
list, the Democratic Pany, the Republican Pany, and the Communist Party. At 
one point in the proceedings, at least two of the members of the Committee insisted 
that he tell the Committee whether he believes in a Supreme Being. . . . 
In r~ Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 102 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
57 366 u.s. 36 (1961). 
58 The Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state 
action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses 
to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifica-
tion." /d. at 44. 
59 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. l, 8 (1971). 
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tion or because he holds certain beliefs. "60 Nor may an applicant be 
required "to state whether he has been or is a 'member of any organi-
zation which advocates the overthrow of the government of the 
United States by force.' "61 Bar admission authorities, however, ap-
parently may ask whether an applicant is or has been a member of 
the Communist Party or of any organization which the applicant 
/cnows to advocate the forcible overthrow of the government and 
which the applicant specijical()' supports in its illegal goals. The Court 
regards these questions as substantially relevant .to an applicant's 
qualifications. 
The result of Konigsberg is that bar admission may be denied on 
moral character grounds solely for refusing to answer questions 
which are substantially relevant to the applicant's qualifications. 
Critics of the rule present this attack: 
The automatic rule means than an applicant, regardless of the 
strength of the rest of his record, can be denied simply because he 
refuses to answer on principle a question he deems improper .. If, 
however, we take the conscientious objector stance seriously-
and there is much in American history to suggest that we 
should-the rule can only operate to prefer applicants who are 
willing to answer over those who on principle are not. But 
among those who will answer must be some insensitive to the pos-
sible impropriety of the question and many sensitive to it but 
persuaded to swallow their indignation in order to be admitted; 
whereas on the other side, assuming good faith, we have those 
who have this much courage in their convictions. The argument, 
therefore, is that the automatic rule is arbitrary in that it prefers 
the servile and insensitive to the courageous-and all under the 
rubric of a proceeding to determine good moral character. 52 
If the bar admission applicant refuses to cooperate in the char-
acter investigation, bar admission authorities have three choices: 
they can deny admission, they can admit the applicant on the chance 
that he is concealing no significant information, or they can conduct 
their own further investigati~n and rely on its results. In cases in-
volving first amendment rights, the latter course is appealing and 
comports with the protections usually afforded admitted lawyers in 
disciplinary proceedings.63 
60 /d. at 6 {emphasis added). 
61 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971); see also Law Students Civil Rights Research Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971). 
62 Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unjinish~d .D~hate BetwmzJustice Harlan 
and Justice Black, 21 LAW IN TRANSITION 155, 185-86 (1961). 
63 The burden of proving misconduct in attorney discipline proceedings is generally 
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Not all applicants who refuse to answer permissible questions 
will be denied admission to the bar, even though the Supreme Court 
has said that they may be. In re Jolles64 involved an applicant who 
admitted prior membership in the Communist Party but asserted 
that he resigned from the party some four years prior to seeking ad-
mission to the bar. The bar admission authority asked the applicant 
to divulge the names of some of his former colleagues in the Commu-
nist Party in order to substantiate his claim that he had resigned. 
The applicant attempted to obtain permission from such people to 
divulge their names and to arrange for the Board of Bar Examiners 
to interview them anonymously. When neither of these efforts to 
protect his former colleagues was successful, the applicant refused to 
disclose any names. The Oregon court was impressed by the appli-
cant's sincerity and his efforts to comply with the Board's demands. 
The court also believed that the further investigation sought by the 
Board was unlikely to yield significant results. In light of these con-
siderations and favorable evidence presented by the applicant, the 
court determined that the applicant satisfied the good moral charac-
ter requirement. 
When a court is faced with a bar admission case in which an 
applicant to the bar has refused to answer questions concerning polit-
ical beliefs and conduct, the most equitable approach is to make a 
balanced assessment, as the court did inJo!!es. The court should con-
sider the full record, including the likely probative value of the unan-
swered questions. The Anastap!o approach, under which an applicant 
placed on the party seeking to have discipline imposed. See, e.g., In re Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 
560, 576, 320 N.W.2d 806, 815 (1982); m also note 21 .rupra. 
In addition, an attorney may not be disbarred for refusing to answer, on fifth amend-
ment grounds, questions put to him in disciplinary proceedings. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 
511 (1967). Justice Harlan, in his dissent, noted the logical extension of this rule to bar ad· 
mission cases: 
(The holding of the majority] exposes this Court itself to the possible indignity 
that it may one day have to admit to its own bar [a lawyer who asserts his fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination] unless it can somehow get at the truth 
of suspicions, the investigation of which the applicant has previously succeeded in 
blocking. For I can perceive no distinction between "admission" and "disbarment" 
in the rationale of what is now held. 
Id. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
If a fifth amendment refusal to answer questions cannot be grounds for disbarment or 
denial of admission, should not a good faith refusal on first amendment grounds be treated 
similarly, even though courts may not be required to do so? 
It should be noted, however, that the scope of the fifth amendment protection in lawyer 
discipline cases remains unsettled. For a useful analysis and compilation of cases, see 
ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 101: 2401-03 (1984). 
64 235 Or. 262, 383 P.2d 388 (1963). 
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may be denied admission upon refusal to answer relevant questions 
even in the absence of any damaging information, seems more puni-
tive than sensible. TheJo!!es approach does entail a risk that a truth-
ful, but violent revolutionary with a fairly clean record may refuse to 
answer political questions and be admitted to the bar. This possibil-
ity, however, is obviously remote and is by far outweighed by the 
interest in treating bar admission applicants fairly. 
One final case involving an applicant's misconduct in the bar 
admission process relating to his political belief and conduct war-
rants attention. The applicant in Sz"ege! v. Committee of Bar Examiners 65 
was a radical activist in Berkeley around 1970. During the character 
investigation, the California Committe of Bar Examiners reviewed 
recordings of three speeches which the applicant had delivered to 
Berkeley residents. The committee interpreted these speeches, which 
expounded a radical political theory and called for concerted action, 
as advocating unlawful violence. The applicant denied that his 
speeches carried that meaning or intent. Concluding that the appli-
cant's denials were lies and that he therefore lacked good moral char-
acter, the committee recommended against admission. It specifically 
stated that it found a lack of good moral character on the basis of the 
applicant's lies, not on the basis of his advocacy of unlawful vio-
lence.66 Thus, the determinative issue was what the applicant 
claimed he had said, not the freedom to speak the words in the first 
place. 
In discussing this issue, the Supreme Court of California held: 
If a prospective speaker knows that at some time in the future he 
may be called upon to interpret his remarks before a body con-
cerned with his admission to professional status, and that such 
admission may depend upon his making an assessment of those 
remarks which agrees with that made by the official body itself, 
he may well feel constrained to confine his public utterances to 
statements wholly free of ambiguous and provocative aspects. 
The inevitable result would be a dampening of the vigor of spo-
ken expression.67 
The court ordered that the applicant be admitted because it could 
not conclude "beyond any reasonable doubt that the applicant's version 
[of his original words' meaning} not only [was} objectively false but 
[had] been advanced by him with an intent to deceive the 
65 10 Cal. 3d 156, 514 P.2d 967, 110 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1973). 
66 /d. at 165, 514 P.2d at 973-74, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22. 
67 /d. at 175-76, 514 P.2d at 981, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 29. 
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Committee. "68 
In the cases in which the applicant's misconduct in the bar ad-
mission process involves political belief and conduct, the misconduct 
usually is a refusal to answer questions. In non-politics cases, how-
ever, the applicant's misconduct usually consists of concealing dam-
aging information or giving misleading or false answers to questions. 
This misconduct often concerns prior illegal conduct.69 It is often 
difficult to tell whether those cases in which the applicant was denied 
admission are based principally on the applicant's cover-up in the 
character investigation or on other forms of misconduct, including 
the conduct which was concealed. In virtually all the cases resulting 
in denial, misconduct outside of the character investigation would 
have justified denial of admission. 70 Thus, it is possible that miscon-
duct in the bar admission process, although often cited as a basis for 
denying admission, is largely a make-weight or pretextual rationale. 
Reese v. Board of Commissioners, 71 a recent Alabama case, is an in-
teresting study in the weight accorded candor in the bar admission 
process. In his first year of law school, the applicant in Reese filed an 
application for registration as a law student. The application re-
quired disclosure of any instances in which the applicant was 
charged with violating federal or state law or city ordinances, other 
than minor traffic violations. In response to this question, the appli-
cant disclosed convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the 
influence of drugs and for disorderly conduct. Subsequently, the Al-
abama State Bar Committee on Character and Fitness learned that 
the applicant failed to disclose thirteen additional brushes with the 
law. The undisclosed information included additional convictions 
for driving while intoxicated, disorderly conduct, and possession of 
an open can of beer in a moving vehicle, as well as arrests not resul-
ting in convictions for possession of marijuana, posession of narcotics, 
68 !d. at 178-79, 514 P.2d at 983, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 31. 
69 Sore, e.g., In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 387 N.E.2d 278 (1979) (failure to disclose name 
change in an attempt to conceal felony conviction), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); In re 
Bowen, 84 Nev. 681, 447 P.2d 658 (1969) (false statements concerning prior arrests and con-
victions); In re Davis, 38 Ohio St. 2d 273, 313 N.E.2d 363 (1974) (evasive answers respecting 
felony conviction). 
70 See, e.g., Spears v. State Bar of Cal., 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697 (1930) (failure to disclose 
charges filed in other states involving forgery, misappropriation of guardianship funds, and 
receiving stolen goods, because charges had been dismissed or conviction reversed on appeal); 
In re Ascher, 81 Ill. 2d 485, 411 N.E.2d 1 (1980) (failure to disclose pending lawsuit charging 
applicant with "gross misconduct including fraud and forgery"); In re Moore, 301 N.C. 634, 
272 S.E.2d 826 (1981) (failure to disclose assault conviction, although murder conviction was 
disclosed). 
71 379 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1980). 
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and disturbing the peace. Some of these additional charges were 
later disclosed by the applicant in hearings; others were revealed by 
outside sources. The applicant was also less than candid in hearings 
held to further investigate his character.72 Moreover, the committee 
received two derogatory letters and one derogatory affidavit concern-
ing the applicant's character, although the committee apparently did 
not rely on these character assessments in its decision not to certify 
the applicant. 
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the applicant estab-
lished his good moral character through several favorable letters of 
recommendation from judges and lawyers. The court held that the 
record as a whole created no substantial doubt about the applicant's 
good moral character, even though the omissions, both in number 
and seriousness, suggested an intent to conceal the facts. The court 
made no attempt to justify or explain the applicant's lack of candor. 
Presumably, because the concealed facts did not themselves justify an 
adverse character ruling, neither did the misc;onduct in the bar ad-
mission process. An opposite result might well be reached under 
Schware,13 Koni'gsberg14 and the Code of Professional Responsibility.75 
These facts present an interesting dilemma. In the context of 
bar admission, should a lie about inconsequential matters carry the 
same significance as a lie about possibly-dispositive matters? If not, 
then dishonesty in the bar admission process is itself inconsequential. 
If Reese were an anomaly, the court's magnanimous treatment of 
the applicant's misconduct in the bar admission process would not be 
especially disturbing. Other decisions, however, reflect the same atti-
tude. In In re Klahr, 76 the Supreme Court of Arizona determined, 
without any specific explanation, that an applicant was of good 
moral character notwithstanding a finding by the Committee on Ex-
aminations and Admission that he was "less than truthful" in his 
72 At the second hearing before the Committee on Character and Fitness, in response to a 
direct question, Reese stated that he had made full disclosure. However, when confronted 
with information concerning additional offenses, he admitted them. At the third hearing, 
Reese disclosed still other offenses. /d. at 566. 
73 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (permits denial ofbar admis-
sion on moral character grounds if the conduct in question has a rational connection with the 
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law). 
74 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (permits denial of bar admission if 
the applicant is not candid in the character investigation). 
75 DR 1-lOl(A) prohibits a lawyer from making false statements in the bar admission 
process. Su also MoDEL RuLES OJo' PROl'ESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (1983). 
76 102 Ariz. 529, 433 P.2d 977 (1967). 
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testimony before the committee.77 In In re Waters,18 the Nevada court 
admitted an applicant who, in response to a specific question, did not 
disclose his expulsion from a law school for cheating on the Law 
School Admission Test. The court concluded that the concealment 
of the expulsion was not deliberate. 
These cases seem to undervalue the significance of misconduct 
in the bar admission process. 79 Bar admission authorities should rec-
ognize that the ultimate effect of treating lies about inconsequential 
matters as inconsequential is to treat all lies in the bar admission 
process as inconsequential. Requiring truthfulness of lawyers should 
be more than a rhetorical exercise. 
III. Prior Illegal Conduct 
The Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits lawyers from 
engaging in illegal conduct in the course of representing clients80 and 
from engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.81 Be-
cause most applicants to the bar have never practiced law, the prohi-
bition against illegal conduct in the course of representing clients 
rarely affects moral character determinations in bar admission cases. 
Illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, on the other hand, can be, 
and frequently is, the basis for denying bar admission. This standard 
naturally raises questions about what constitutes "illegal" conduct 
and what conduct involves "moral turpitude." The choice of the 
word "illegal," rather than "criminal," may be telling. Non-criminal 
77 lrl. at 530, 433 P.2d at 978. 
78 84 Nev. 712, 447 P.2d 661 (1968). 
79 The most flagrant undervaluation. of dishonesty in the bar admission process may be 
contained in State Bar v. Turner, 31 Cal. 2d 842, 192 P.2d 897 (1948), in which the California 
court came precariously close to saying that dishonesty in the bar admission process is not an 
appropriate basis for denying admission. In the context of a proceeding to revoke an attor-
ney's license based on dishonesty in the bar admission process, the court distinguished two 
similar cases in which revocation was not ordered "because in neither of those proceedings 
was it shown that the facts concealed would have justified the committee in refusing to recom-
mend admission." /d. at 844, 192 P.2d at 897-98. 
However, it is wise to remember that at least two factOrs complicate such decisions. 
First, predictions regarding an applicant's future transgressions if admitted to practice are 
highly inexact. &~text accompanying notes 6-9 supra. Second, notwithstanding serious char-
acter-related blemishes on an applicant's record, favorable evidence of good moral character 
may outweigh the negative evidence. s~~. e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 
232 (1957). 
80 MODEL CODE 01' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7)-(8) (1982). 
81 MODEL CODE 01' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(3) (1982); cf. MODEL 
RULES 01' PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983) (professional misconduct includes 
criminal acts which reflect "adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects"). 
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activity may be illegal in at least two senses: the conduct may not 
have resulted in a criminal conviction, or the conduct may carry only 
civil consequences. In bar admission cases, courts have held that ac-
quittal or dismissal of criminal charges does not preclude considera-
tion of the conduct underlying those charges in the character 
assessment.82 Moreover, applicants with records of shady dealings 
have been denied admission even though never charged with a crime 
nor apparently guilty of any criminal conduct. 83 
Moral turpitude is a virtually useless standard for establishing 
lack of moral character. Footnotes to the official American Bar Asso-
ciation version of the Code of Professional Responsibility define 
"good moral character" as "qualities of truth, of a high sense of 
honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary 
responsibility."84 "Moral turpitude" is defined as "baseness, vileness 
or depravity in the duties which one person owes to another or to 
society in general. "85 In short, good moral character is goodness and 
moral turpitude is badness, neither possessing fixed boundaries. 
At common law, attorneys were automatically disbarred upon 
conviction of any felony or upon conviction of a misdemeanor in-
volving fraud or dishonesty.86 In the bar admission process, most 
courts now take a more expansive view. These courts will consider 
the nature, number of instances, and recency of the illegal conduct, 
as well as other evidence tending to show present moral character 
and evidence of rehabilitation.s7 
The legion of bar admission cases involving the impact of prior 
illegal conduct on the good moral character requirement are usefully 
82 Su note 46 supra. 
83 &e, e.g., In re Kadans, 93 Nev. 216, 562 P.2d 490 (1977) (denial based on apparent 
misrepresentations outside of the character investigation concerning applicant's authorship of 
books, possession of academic degrees, professional appointments, and nature of a correspon-
dence school operated by applicant), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 805 (I977); In re Alpert, 269 Or. 
508, 525 P.2d 1042 (1974) (denial based on applicant's involvement in dubious, though possi-
bly legal, stock transactions); see also text accompanying notes 125-27 in.fra. · 
84 MODEl. CODE OF PROI<"ESSIONAl. RESPONSIBILITY Canon I n.I4 (1982) (quoting 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
85 MODEl. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBil.ITY Canon I n.13 (I982) (quoting Com-
mittee on Legal Ethics v. Scheer, 149 W.Va. 721, 726-27, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145 (I965)). 
86 &e Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883). At common law, disbarment could also be 
based on gross malpractice, dishonesty, or conduct gravely affecting the lawyer's professional 
character. /d. at 273. 
Some jurisdictions continue to maintain an absolutist treatment of lawyers convicted of 
felonies who have not received a full pardon for the conviction. Ste, e.g., In re Florida Bd. of 
Examiners, 350 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1977); In re Kastenbaum, 341 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1976); In re 
Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966). 
87 &e, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
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catalogued elsewhere.88 More pertinent to the purpose of this article 
is the identification of the relationship between past illegal conduct 
and the ethical standards imposed upon lawyers. The Code of Pro~ 
fessional Responsibility offers mixed guidance. An ethical considera~ 
tion states: "Because of his position in society, even minor violations 
of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal 
profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law."89 This ad~ 
monition differs substantially from the mandatory precepts of the 
disciplinary rules, where the focus is on illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude and illegal conduct in the course of representing a 
client.90 
The ethical consideration identifies two concerns which are not 
reflected in the disciplinary rules-concerns for the public image of 
the profession and for respect for law. Because these concerns are not 
reflected in the disciplinary rules, they do not supply a rational con-
nection between past illegal conduct and fitness to practice law.91 
Any such rational connection must be grounded in the disciplinary 
rules. 
The disciplinary rule prohibiting illegal conduct in the course of 
representing a client reflects a concern for legitimate limits in fur~ 
thering a client's interests,92 while the disciplinary rule prohibiting 
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude suggests a concern for mo~ 
rality as distinct from legality.93 One major difficulty is that the dis~ 
ciplinary rules do not provide a workable standard for identifying 
''moral turpitude." The mental state of the actor should generally be 
considered relevant: one who engages in unintentional illegal con-
duct is less morally culpable than one who engages in intentional 
88 Su Annat., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978). 
89 MODEL CODE 01-" PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1982); see also id., EC 9-6. 
90 Ste notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text. 
91 Courts sometimes discipline lawyers for the sole stated reason that a failure to disci-
pline the lawyer would likely harm the public image of the legal profession. See notes 108-13 
i'n.fra and accompanying text. To permit a concern for the public image of the profession to 
stand as an independent basis for denying bar admission on moral character grounds substan-
tially departs from the requirement that denial be based on conduct rationally connected 
with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Adverse public reaction to an appli-
cant's bar admission cannot be tantamount to unfitness to practice law, if unfitness to prac-
tice law is to be defined in a principled (i.e. rational) way. 
Respect for law also fails to provide a useful standard. It cannot be (and is not) rigor-
ously applied to deny admission to every applicant who ever committed an illegal act. See, 
e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). "Minor violations of law" are 
treated, ordinarily, as not dispositive of moral character issues. 
92 This issue applies almost exclusively to bar admission cases in which the applicant was 
previously admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction. 
93 In this context, "illegality" constitutes a larger universe than "immorality." 
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illegal conduct. Additionally, a person whose illegal act is malum 
prohibitum is considered less morally culpable than one whose illegal 
act is malum in se, while conduct in violation of civil law is generally 
considered less morally repugnant than conduct in violation of crimi-
nal law. 
Theoretically, these distinctions could be the basis for formula-
tion of an objective rule, such as limiting the scope of "illegal con-
duct involving moral turpitude" to intentional acts in violation of 
criminal laws which prohibit conduct which is malum in se. Hard 
and fast rules, however, are inappropriate in this area, particularly 
since evidence of rehabilitation plays an important role in good 
moral character cases involving past illegal conduct. Certain illegal 
conduct such as criminal abuse of the legal process, fraud, and em-
bezzlement, is clearly incompatible with ethical standards imposed 
upon lawyers and may therefore justify denial of admission to the 
bar.94 Just as clearly, isolated and dated instances of shoplifting, pos-
session of beer as a minor, and intoxication ought not, by themselves, 
justify denial of admission.95 Between these extremes lies an ex-
traordinary diversity of cases which yields little concrete guidance as 
to when past illegal conduct will block admission and when proof of 
rehabilitation offsets the negative impact of such conduct. 
These cases have sometimes resulted in perplexing inconsisten-
cies. For example, the Supreme Court of Maryland recently decided 
two cases involving past illegal conduct. In 1981, the court denied 
bar admission to an applicant who had been convicted of stealing 
sleeping pills and leaving the scene of an accident, notwithstanding a 
psychologist's report that the applicant had resolved the problems 
leading to his earlier behavior,96 In 1982, the court ordered that the 
convicted driver of a getaway car in a bank robbery who failed to 
fully disclose the circumstances of the conviction on his bar applica-
tion be admitted on evidence ~f rehabilitation and present good 
94 Cf. In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977) (pro hac vice admission denied based 
on plea of guilty to two counts of criminal contempt for delaying and giving evasive testi-
mony before a federal grand jury); Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (admission to 
the bar denied because of mail fraud conviction), cerl. deni'ed, 368 U.S. 865 (1961); People ex 
rei. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737 (1905) (disbarment for failure to disclose 
embezzlement conviction in another state in application for admission). 
95 Su, e.g., In re David H., 294 Md. 546, 451 A.2d 657 (1982) (applicant conditionally 
admitted despite pleas of nolo contendere to shoplifting charges); In re Schaeffer, 273 Or. 490, 
541 P.2d 1400 (1975) (applicant admitted despite conviction for possession of beer as ami-
nor); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966) (applicant permitted to take bar 
examination, despite denial five years earlier, where only recent offense was for intoxication). 
96 In re G.S., 291 Md. 182, 433 A.2d 1159 (1981}. 
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moral character.97 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, recently adopted by 
the American Bar Association, abandon the standard of "illegal con-
duct involving moral turpitude" and prohibit instead any "criminal 
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects."98 This standard is amplified by 
the following comment to the Rules: 
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to prac-
tice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful 
failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of of-
fense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction 
was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude., 
That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning 
some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and compa-
rable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the 
practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to 
the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answer-
able only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics 
relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, 
breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of 
justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even 
ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indi-
cate indifference to legal obligation.99 
Thus, the Model Rules establish a criminal misconduct provi-
sion that operates very much like the good moral character require-
ment for bar admission: the focus is upon fitness to practice law. 
The standard permits broad discretion, but requires a rational con-
nection between the criminal act and fitness to practice law before a 
lawyer may be disciplined. The effect is to bring the disciplinary 
rules for attorneys and the good moral character requirement for bar 
applicants into virtual conformity. 
Some courts have recognized the logical necessity of treating bar 
admission applicants and admitted lawyers alike. The Supreme 
Court of California, for example, has held: 
97 In re G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107 (1982). 
In North Carolina, an applicant was denied admission on moral character grounds be-
cause of convictions for trespassing, driving while intoxicated, and driving in violation of a 
limited driving license. In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Willis v. North Carolina State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 423 U.S. 976 (1975). In Alabama, an 
applicant established his good moral character notwithstanding two convictions for driving 
while intoxicated, three convictions for disorderly conduct, and several additional arrests, 
some of which resulted in additional convictions. Reese v. Board ofComm'rs, 279 So. 2d 564 
(Ala. 1980). 
98 MODEL RULES 01:.- PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983). 
99 ld., Rule 8.4 comment. 
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Fundamentally, the question involved in both situations is the 
same-is the applicant for admission or the attorney sought to be 
disciplined a fit and proper person to be permitted to practice 
law, and that usually turns upon whether he has committed or is 
likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude. 100 
91 
Other jurisdictions, however, treat admitted lawyers and bar ap-
plicants very differently in fitness determinations relating to illegal 
conduct. For example, an applicant in Florida was denied bar ad-
mission on moral character grounds because he failed to file income 
tax returns, 101 even though Florida lawyers recently subject to disci-
pline actions for failing to file income tax returns had not been dis-
barred, but had merely been reprimanded. 102 The Florida court 
justified the different standards for admission and disbarment on the 
theory that denial of admission is less severe than disbarment since 
an applicant denied admission may reapply after two years. 103 
This justification is suspect. A court which imposes a public rep-
rimand as the sole sanction for an admitted lawyer who has engaged 
in illegal conduct has obviously not determined that the lawyer is 
unfit to practice law. If the failure to file an income tax return does 
not establish unfitness for an admitted lawyer, how can the same act 
establish unfitness for a bar applicant? 
Even if admitted lawyers and bar admission applicants are 
treated alike, difficult questions remain. Determining what illegal 
conduct is rationally connected with fitness to practice law can be 
perplexing. Standards for establishing rehabilitation are also elusive, 
in part because the most convincing evidence of rehabilitation is 
often the simple passage of time without transgressions. 
The treatment of lawyers who have failed to file income tax re-
turns illustrates the difficulty of assessing the rational connection be-
tween specific illegal acts performed in a lawyer's non-professional 
life and the lawyer's fitness to practice law. The Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct states that the wilful failure to file income tax re-
100 Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447,453,421 P.2d 76, 81,55 Cal. 
Rptr. 228, 233 (1966); see alro In re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1979) (Adkins, J., 
dissenting). 
101 In re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1979). 
102 See Florida Bar v. Turner, 344 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1977) (public reprimand); Florida Bar 
v. Soloman, 338 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1976) (six-month suspension where failure to file income tax 
return was coupled with other instances of misconduct); In re Schonfeld, 336 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 
1976) (public reprimand); Florida Bar v. Silver, 313 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1975) (public repri-
mand); In re Snyder, 313 So. 2d 33 {Fla. 1975) (public reprimand). 
103 In re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1979). 
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turns is rationally connected to fitness to practice law, 104 but offers no 
rationale for that conclusion. Many lawyer discipline cases involving 
the failure to file income tax returns are reported, 105 with results 
ranging from findings of no cognizable misconduct 106 to long-term 
suspensions. 107 Those courts favoring serious discipline are con-
cerned primarily with preserving public confidence in the legal pro-
fession, 108 while those courts opposing discipline believe that serious 
discipline is warranted only where the lawyer is likely to breach his 
professional duties to clients or tribunals. 109 
Courts and bar admission authorities must decide how broadly 
the net should be cast to protect the public. If the goal is to rout out 
all lawyers who might cause members of the public to distrust the 
legal profession generally, the net must be cast very broadly. If, on 
the other hand, the courts are seeking only to protect the public from 
lawyers who would victimize them or victimize the legal process it-
self, the net does not need to be cast as broadly. A choice between 
these alternative goals is essential if the meaning of "fitness to prac-
tice law" is to be clear. Otherwise, the goal of consistent and rational 
decision-making about unprofessional misconduct will remam 
elusive. 110 
IV. Financial Malfeasance 
A disciplinary rule of the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility states that a lawyer may not "[e]ngage in any ... conduct that 
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." 111 Under this catch-
104 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) comment (1983). 
105 See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 476 (1975); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 512 (1975). 
106 See, ~.g., In r~ Anonymous No. 1, 45 A.D.2d 88, 357 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1973). 
107 &e In re Lambert, 4 7 Ill. 2d 223, 265 N.E.2d 101 (1970) (five year suspension for failing 
to file returns for 17 years). 
108 See, e.g., In re O'Hallaren, 64 Ill. 2d 426, 434, 356 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (1976) ("An 
attorney's failure to file returns and his subsequent conviction of that offense diminish public 
confidence in the legal profession and tend to bring it into disrepute."); see also note 91 supra. 
109 &e, ~.g., In re Gillis, 402 Mich. 286, 293, 262 N.W.2d 646, 649 (1978) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) ("The rules should ... provide that only misconduct in the course of professional 
activities or conduct outside of professional activities indicating that a lawyer can no longer 
be trusted to represent clients or appear in court warrants discipline."); see note 94 supra. 
110 If the broader standard-harm to the public image of the legal profession-is adopted, 
consistent and rational decision-making about unprofessional misconduct may remain an im-
possible goal. Such factors as media coverage and speculations as to public opinion clearly 
affect the projected harm to the profession's image that a given instance of misconduct is 
likely to cause. These factors are unprincipled and do not lead to consistent and rational 
decision-making. 
111 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1982). But se~ note 
14 supra. 
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all rule and Schware, an applicant whose conduct, even if wholly le-
gal, has a rational connection with unfitness to practice law could be 
denied admission. Applicants have been denied admission to the bar 
on moral character grounds because of financial malfeasance, even 
though no illegal conduct was involved. The most striking examples 
are a recent group of cases in which applicants avoided student loan 
obligations through bankruptcy proceedings.1 12 
Student loans are a peculiar species of debt, especially in the 
context of bankruptcy proceedings. Students, unlike most borrowers, 
generally have no tangible assets to pledge as security for the fulfill-
ment of their student loan obligations. In congressional debate on 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Congressman Erlenborn of Illinois 
stated: 
The student ... , not having assets to pledge, is pledging his 
future earning power. Having pledged that future earning 
power, if, shortly after graduation and before having an opportu-
nity to get assets to repay the debt, he seeks to discharge that 
obligation, I say that is tantamount to fraud. 1l3 
Although some courts may share these sentiments, the su-
premacy clause of the Constitution restricts their ability to determine 
that a bar admission applicant lacks good moral character based on 
his legal invocation of bankruptcy proceedings to discharge student 
loan obligations. Under the supremacy clause, state laws may not 
frustrate the full effectiveqess of federal laws. 114 A primary purpose 
of federal bankruptcy law is "to give debtors a new opportunity in 
life and a clear field for future effort."115 Denying bar admission be-
cause an applicant legally avoided student loan obligations frustrates 
the full effectiveness of federal bankruptcy law anq the cleansing wa-
ters which it provides. 1t6 
In In re Gahan~ 117 the Minnesota Supreme Court denied bar ad-
mission to an applicant who discharged $14,000 in federally-guaran-
teed student loan obligations through bankruptcy proceedings, while 
affirming all other dischargeable debts. 118 The court concluded that 
112 In re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979); In 
re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 647 P.2d 462 (1982). 
113 124 CONG. REC. 1793 (1978). 
114 See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971). 
115 /d. at 648. 
116 See general(y Special Project, Admission lo the Bar: A Consti'tuti'onal Ana!Jsis, 34 V AND. L. 
REV. 655, 696-710 (1981). 
117 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979). 
118 At the time that Gahan invoked the federal Bankruptcy Act, it permitted the full 
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the applicant was financially able to meet his student loan obliga-
tions at all relevant times. In denying admission, the court held: 
A flagrant disregard of this repayment responsibility by the loan 
recipient indicates to us a lack of moral commitment to the rights 
of other students and particularly to the rights of creditors. Such 
flagrant financial irresponsibility reflects adversely on an appli-
cant's ability to manage financial matters and reflects adversely 
on his commitment to the rights of others, thereby reflecting ad-
versely on his fitness for the practice of law. It is appropriate to 
prevent problems from such irresponsibility by denying admis-
sion, rather than se~k to remedy the problem after it occurs and 
victimizes a client.tl9 
The rational connection between the applicant's bankruptcy 
and his fitness to practice law is hazy at best. 120 The federal policy, 
now altered, which allowed students to fully discharge their student 
loans like any other debt 121 might well be criticized; abuses were sub-
stantial, as the facts in Gahan illustrate. Nevertheless, the legal pur-
suit of federal rights, even if improvidently granted, does not portend 
the victimization of clients. The links which the court found between 
the applicant's discharge of his student loans and unfitness to prac-
tice law-inability to manage financial matters and lack of commit-
ment to the rights of others-are rather weak. Respecting the ability 
to manage financial matters, the facts in Gahan suggest that this may 
have been a particular strength of the applicant. He maximized the 
value of his exempt assets in contemplation of bankruptcy and took 
full advantage of the cleansing waters that federal bankruptcy law 
provides. In doing so, he was careful to preserve his creditworthiness 
by affirming all debts other than student loans. Nothing in the appli-
cant's bankruptcy suggested any legally-cognizable fraud, deceit, or 
moral turpitude. 122 
The court held that the applicant's discharge of his student 
loans in bankruptcy adversely affected the rights of creditors and 
other students. Bankruptcy law, however, places a clear limit on 
creditors' rights by establishing a set of debtors' rights. The appli-
cant's bankruptcy infringed upon no creditors' rights; it was merely 
discharge of student loans like any other debt. Stt 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1976), amended by 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. II 1978). 
119 /d. at 831. 
120 It is possible that the Cahan court was voicing its dissent to the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, now altered, which permitted the full discharge of student loans like any other 
debt. 
121 Su note 118 supra. 
122 279 N.W.2d at 828. 
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an exercise of the applicant's rights as a debtor. 123 Under federal law 
at the time, the discharge of student loan obligatiC?ns in ba~kruptcy 
was simply one vehicle through which Congress implemented its be-
lief that sound public policy favored ·the discharge of debts in bank-
ruptcy; Congress viewed the debtor's right to a fresh start as more 
compelling than the creditor's right to repayment. The applicant in 
Cahan did no more than effectively secure his legal rights against 
creditors. · 
The applicant's bankruptcy affected the rights of other students 
in only the most amorphous sense. If permitting the discharge of 
student loans through bankruptcy was an uriwise policy, it was for 
Congress to change the policy; the applicant was under no obligation 
to refrain from exercising a right created by federal law. Allowing a 
business expense deduction for the "three-martini lunch" may be an 
unwise federal policy; yet, few would conclude that lawyers who de-
duct such expenses, thereby endangering the continued availability 
of more legitimate deductions for business lunches and also increas-
ing the tax burden on others, are therefore unfit' to practice law. 
Bar admission authorities and courts ought no't to label appli-
cants as lacking good moral character and therefore refuse them the 
opportunity to engage in a profession for which they are otherwise 
qualified on the basis of their assertion of clearly-recognized legal 
rights. This is especially true where, as in Cahan, it is difficult to see 
what forms of unethical conduct the applicant would engage in if 
admitted to the bar. 
Financial malfeasance qnrelated to student l~~n obligations has 
·proven an impediment to bar admission in a few additional cases; 
however, most such cases involve conduct which appears to be ille-
gal.124 One exception is In re Alpert, 125 in which an applicant was 
denied admission because of his involvement in "dubious," although 
apparently legal, stock transactions while in law school. The appli-
cant had purchased stocks on credit, expecting to pay for the stocks 
out of interim increases in their value. The stocks decreased in value 
after the applicant's purchase and before the deadline for payment, 
123 Moreover, a lack of commitment to the rights of creditors is arguably unrelated to 
victimizing clients, since an attorney's relationship to his client is of a fiduciary nature, 
whereas a debtor's relationship to his creditor is not. 
124 Su, ~.g., In r~ Appell, 116 N.H. 400, 359 A.2d 634 (1976) (violation of various statutes 
and regulations in operation of construction business); In re Cheek, 246 Or. 433, 425 P.2d 763 
(1967) (signing employer's name on checks without authority to do so; issuing personal checks 
without sufficient funds). 
125 269 Or. 508, 525 P.2d 1042 (1974). 
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with the majority of the losses falling on the seller. The Oregon court 
denied the applicant admission to the bar, despite a favorable recom-
mendation from the trial committee of the Board of Bar Examiners. 
The court held that the legality of the transactions was "beside the 
point" 126 and that "doubts of consequence" about an applicant's 
moral character were to be construed against the applicant and in 
favor of the public's protection. 127 
In other words, the applicant in Alpert was denied admission be-
cause of "doubts" created by financially disasterous, but apparently 
legal, stock transactions. It seems likely that, if the applicant's stock 
transactions had yielded a profit instead of a loss, the court would 
not ·have denied admission. The court expressed concern that the 
applicant was willing to take financial chances, knowing that he 
would be unable to make up the losses in the event that the enter-
prise failed. The court failed to consider that such risks are common 
to many business ventures-so common that investors usually con-
sider them carefully before making any financial commitment. 
A court which determines that legal conduct in financial affairs 
has a rational connection with fitness for law practice is making a 
business judgment with respect to that financial conduct. Such a 
court is, in effect, substituting its own business judgment for that of 
the applicant and his investors and labeling it "moral" judgment. 
Courts and bar admission authorities alike ought to be extremely 
wary of denying admission on this basis, and in no event should invo-
cation of a clear, federally-provided right trigger denial of admission 
to the bar. 
V. Mental or Emotional Instability 
The most nebulous basis for denying admission on moral char-
acter grounds is that the applicant's personality is unfit for the prac-
tice of law due to mental or emotional instability. 128 While no 
126 /d. at 514, 525 P.2d at 1045. 
127 /d. at 518, 525 P.2d at 1046. 
128 Surprisingly few moral character cases involve actual mental illness. Perhaps some 
cases in which the court focused on illegal conduct involve applicants suffering from mental 
illness where the illegal conduct is symptomatic of the illness, although in no case has the 
court identified this relationship. A number of illegal conduct cases involve alcohol or drug 
abuse. Su In re A.T., 286 Md. 507,408 A.2d 1023 (1979) (drug addiction); In re Gimbel, 271 
Or. 671, 533 P.2d 810 (1975) (alcoholism); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966) 
(alcoholism). 
Although it bears little on contemporary bar admission issues, it is interesting to note the 
primordial impediment to bar admission relating to unfitness of an applicant's personality. 
At common law, women were ineligible for admission to the bar. See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 
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disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility directly 
address the problem of mental or emotional instability, an ethical 
consideration does: 
An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be un-
qualified, temporarily of permanently, for other than moral and 
educational reasons, such as mental or emotional instability. 
Lawyers should be diligent in taking steps to see that during a 
period of disqualification such person is not granted a license or, 
if licensed, is not permitted to practice. 12 9 
Reported bar admission decisions in this area generally involve per-
sons who exhibit abnormal behavior, whether or not victims of 
mental illness. The form of abnormal behavior which appears to 
give bar admission authorities the greatest pause is a combative per-
sonality, often coupled with a tendency to make enemies (or perceive 
others as enemies) and to hurl invectives at those real or perceived 
enemies. 
The applicant in In re· Latimer13° filed a "scurrilous" petition with 
the Illinois Supreme Court attacking members of the Committee on 
Character and Fitness, circulated pamphlets disparaging members of 
that committee and members of the Illinois court, and submitted an 
affidavit accusing character witnesses before the committee of being 
Communists. The court held that these tactics in the character in-
vestigation process for bar admission thwarted, and demonstrated 
contempt for, the orderly administration of the investigation andre-
535, 538-40 (1869), afid m6 nom. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 {1872). The ration-
ale for this exclusion was expressed in an 1875 Wisconsin decision: 
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture 
of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and their 
maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent 
with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession of the law, are 
departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it .... 
The peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its 
tender susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional impulses, its subordination 
of hard reason to sympathetic feeling, are surely not qualifications for forensic strife. 
Nature has tempered woman as little for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as 
for the physical conflicts of the battle field. Womanhood is moulded for gentler and 
better things. 
In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245, 20 A.R. 42, 46-4 7 (1875). In this instance, the lawyer's occu-
pation, rather than the bar applicant, was found wanting of "good moral character." The 
profession of law "has essentially and habitually to do with all that is selfish and malicious, 
knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive and obscene, in human life." /d. at 245, 20 
A.R. at 47. Following the enactment in 1878 of a legislative provision expressly prohibiting 
denial of bar admission in Wisconsin based on sex, Ms. Goodell was admitted to practice. In 
re Goodell, 48 Wis. 693, 81 N.W. 551 {1879). 
129 MODEL CODE m· PROfESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-6 (1982). 
130 11 Ill. 2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20 (1957), appeal dismissed and cerl. dmz'ed, 355 U.S. 82 (1957). 
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fleeted negatively on the applicant's moral fitness for law practice. 
For these and other reasons, the applicant was denied admission. 
In re Feingold 131 concerned an applicant whose prior history al-
legedly indicated "a propensity to engage in unwarranted character 
assassination." 132 In unrelated events, the applicant had: been in-
dicted (but not tried) for criminal libel; struck opposing counsel dur-
ing an administrative hearing; by his own admission, called the 
Attorney General "every name in the book"; 133 and made a deroga-
tory remark in the presence of others to a judge before whom he had 
a case. The moral character issue concerning this applicant was not 
resolved due to procedural infirmities; however, the court indicated 
that "[t]urbulent, intemperate or irresponsible behavior is a proper 
basis for denial of admission to the bar." 134 
In In re Martin- Tngona, 135 the court denied admission to an appli-
cant with a "propensity to unreasonably react against anyone whom 
he believes opposes him." 136 The applicant had accused a judge who 
ruled against him of a "pathological antipathy" against him which 
rendered the judge "temporarily mentally insane." 137 In addition, 
the applicant had referred to an attorney who served a notice of for-
feiture upon him and who suffered from a mild case of cerebral palsy 
as a "palsied lunatic" and described him as "shaking and tottering 
and drooling like an idiot . . . a physically and mentally sick 
man." 138 In denying admission, the court determined that the appli-
cant lacked "the qualities of responsibility, candor, fairness, self-re-
straint, objectivity and respect for the judicial system which are 
necessary adjuncts to the orderly administration of justice." 139 
Latimer, Feingold, and Martin-Tngona share a central element: the 
bar admission applicant became malicious in response to legal set-
backs. Ethical considerations encourage lawyers to be ''temperate 
and dignified" 140 and disciplinary rules prohibit a lawyer from tak-
ing action "merely to harass or maliciously injure another." 141 Thus, 
131 296 A.2d 492 (Me. 1972). 
132 /d. at 498. 
133 /d. at 499. 
134 ld. at 500. 
135 55 Ill. 2d 301, 302 N.E.2d 68 (1973), cal. dmid, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) . 
136 ld. at 308, 302 N.E.2d at 72. 
137 ld. 
138 ld. at 310, 302 N.E.2d at 73. 
139 ld. at 312, 302 N.E.2d at 74. 
140 MoDEL Com: Of PRofESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1982). 
141 MODEL CODE 01:' PROFESSlONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(l) (1983); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (1983). 
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the applicants' misconduct in Latziner, Feingold, and Martin-Trigona 
may be rationally connected to fitness to practice law, as defined by 
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Other bar admission cases suggest that such malicious conduct 
may indicate a lack of good moral character even if it arises apart 
from proceedings before a court or tribunal. For example, the appli-
cant in In rc Ronwi'n142 appeared "mentally unable to reasonably deal 
with the type of social interaction involved in dealing with clients, 
other members of the Bar and the public." 143 Expert testimony indi-
cated that the applicant had a" 'paranoid personality' which is char-
acterized by hypersensitivity, rigidity, unwarranted suspicion, 
excessive self-importance and a tendency to blame others and ascribe 
evil motives to them." 144 The applicant had made critical comments 
and strong charges against administrators and faculty members at 
the law school which he attended and threatened physical violence 
toward others when he became angered during discussions of aca-
demic matters. The court determined that the applicant was unfit 
for law practice because he would probably "bring and prosecute 
groundless claims and subject clients, parties, the Court and adver-
sary counsel to groundless charges of misconduct and 
impropriety." 145 
Psychiatric or psychological evaluations play a role in some of 
the cases involving an applicant's mental or emotional instability,146 
while others use no expert guidance in evaluating the applicant's fit-
ness for practice. 147 The area is a particularly sensitive one, espe-
cially since not all forms and degrees of emotional instability are 
rationally connected with fitness or capacity for law practice. Cer-
tainly, bar admission authorities should deny admission to applicants 
whose mental or emotional instability render them unfit for the prac-
tice of law. The Supreme Court ofVermont recognized the difficulty 
142 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976), mi. denitd .ru6 nom. Ronwin v. Special Comm. on 
Examinations and Admissions, 430 U.S. 907 (1977). 
143 /d. at 359, 555 P.2d at 317. 
144 /d. 
145 /d. at 358, 555 P.2d at 316. The applicant in Ronwin subsequently brought suit 
against the Arizona State Bar and members of Arizona's Committee on Examinations and 
Admissions for antitrust violations in the grading of the Arizona bar examination. The 
United States Supreme Court held that the action of the Committee was an action of the 
Arizona Supreme Court, and thus the Committee's conduct came within the state action 
exemption from the antitrust laws. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984). 
146 See, e.g., In rt Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357,555 P.2d 315 (1976); In re Martin-Trigona, 55 Ill. 
2d 301, 302 N.E.2d 68 (1973); In re Schaengold, 83 Nev. 65, 422 P.2d 686 (1967). 
147 See, e.g., In re Latimer, 11 Ill. 2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20, appeal dirmirred and &t'TI. dmt~d, 355 
u.s. 82 (1957). 
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of such cases in In re Monaghan, 148 in which it permitted an applica-
tion for bar admission from a reformed alcoholic whose admission 
had been denied five years earlier: 
The power of the court to reject the application on the 
grounds of moral delinquency is one of great delicacy, and should 
be exercised with extreme caution, and with a scrupulous regard 
for the character and rights of the applicant. t49 
These decisions are made more delicate by the imprecision of 
standards by which mental or emotional stability is measured. Bar 
admission authorities may feel more comfortable in assessing moral 
character by focusing on the symptoms of mental or emotional insta-
bility rather than on the degree of instability itsel£ 150 
Conclusion 
Virtually everyone would agree that some applicants ought to 
be denied admission to the bar for reasons unrelated to their techni-
cal legal skills. To use an extreme case, nearly all would agree that a 
lawyer who was disbarred yesterday for a recent theft of clients' 
funds should not be admitted today to practice law in a neighboring 
jurisdiction. The requirement of "good moral character" is the rule 
upon which the denial would be based. 
Given the desirability of such a requirement, the problem is to 
devise a rule which recognizes the fine line between applicants whose 
past conduct portends future misconduct as a lawyer and those who 
have erred in the past but deserve the opportunity to practice law 
because their error was unrelated to the requirements of law practice 
or because their error is not symptomatic of their present character 
and behavior. The line which has been drawn-the requirement 
that applicants prove their good moral character to be admitted to 
the bar-is, standing alone, extremely imprecise. It "is easily 
adapted to fit personal views and predilections [and] can be a dan-
148 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966). 
149 /d. at 64, 222 A.2d at 674. 
150 For a very useful analysis of the good moral character requirement as it relates to 
mental and emotional stability, especially given the state of medical knowledge in the area of 
mental health, see Place & Bloom, Mental Fzinus Requiremmt.r .for the Prac/zce of law, 23 Buf-
FALO L. R1-:v. 579 (1974). See al.ro Kaslow, Moral, Emotional and Phpii:al Fitness .for the Bar: 
Pondering (seeming) Imponderables, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 38. 
For a recent decision expressly holding that mental and emotional fitness is required for 
admission to practice law, see Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Applicant, 443 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 
1983). The Florida court also held that the burden of demonstrating this fitness is on the 
applicant and that bar admis.~ion authorities may inquire about an applicant's mental and 
emotional fitness without violating the applicant's privacy and due process rights. /d. 
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gerous instrument for arbit.rary and discriminatory denial of the 
right to practice law."tst 
These dangers are lessened somewhat by requiring that a bar 
applicant's past misconduct may block admission only if it is a ra-
tionally connected to his fitness to practice law. 152 But the necessity 
of interpreting "fitness to practice law" may revive all of the dangers 
of a bare "good moral character" standard unless fitness to practice is 
tied to the standards imposed upon persons who actually practice 
law. These standards are embodied in the rules which form the basis 
for disciplining lawyers, usually some variant of the disciplinary rules 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
This article has examined some of the usual patterns of conduct 
resulting in moral character questions. Some of this conduct is closely 
related to disciplinary rules imposed upon lawyers while some bears 
little relation to those rules. Fairness to bar applicants and a uniform 
concern for the protection of the public dictate the need for a closer 
alignment of the fitness assessments made of bar applicants through 
the good moral character requirement and fitness assessments of ad-
mitted lawyers through disciplinary proceedings. While perfect con-
sistency in these assessments may not be attainable, it is certainly a 
worthy goal, especially when the stakes are the protection of the pub-
lic from unethical lawyers, access to the privileges and powers which 
only lawyers enjoy, and the composition of the legal profession in the 
decades to come. 
151 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957). 
152 See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
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